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while the U.S on the contrary opposes ‘automatism’
in ICC jurisdiction as a result of its universality.
Prosecutorial Powers
A major concern of U.S. officials since the
beginning of the Court negotiations in 1994 has been
the ICC prosecutor’s ability to check state decision-
making in order to prevent states from committing
genocide or crimes against humanity (Washburn,
2002).  As the investigations can start without a
referral from either the UN Security Council or a state,
opponents to the ICC assumed that the prosecutor
could attempt to influence domestic policy-making and
violate sovereignty rights (Macpherson & Kaufman,
2002). Therefore the U.S. sought guarantees that only
the UN Security Council should have the power to
start investigations, because such rights in the hands
of a “less-than-impartial prosecutor” (Macpherson &
Kaufman, 2002, p. 220) would not be compatible with
American constitutional safeguards. The appointment
of ICC judges through nomination by the Assembly
of States was also criticized, since these nominations
could be politically motivated. The American
delegation to the Rome Conference stressed that the
ICC prosecutor’s “ability […] to bypass the Security
Council would undermine the settled system of
international governance and the U.S. role in that
system” (Amann, 2002, p. 3). This American
argument was based on Articles 7[1] and 24[1] of
the Charter of the United Nations, which guarantee
the SC the “primary responsibility for the maintenance
of international peace and security” (Amann, 2002,
p. 3). Currently, the United States plays a key role
within the Security Council, as it is one of the five
permanent members with the right for absolute veto.
The ICC is, in this view, a threat to that primacy.
The European response to the American fear
of excessive prosecutorial power was to point to the
safeguards and checks and balances implemented in
the Rome Statute itself. The “unaccountable
prosecutor” (Bolton, 2002, p. 2) was, in the eyes of
the EU negotiators, no more than a theoretical worst-
Introduction
The International Criminal Court (ICC), the
first transnational legal body, has its roots in the ‘Rome
Statute’, signed on July 1, 1998.  It is intended to hold
individuals accountable for the four core crimes of
genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and
the crime of aggression.  To take effect, the ICC
treaty needed to be ratified by at least 60 states;
despite the strong objection of the current U.S.
Administration, this number was reached in April
2002. Shortly before, the Bush Administration had
announced that it did not intend to ratify the Statute,
and moreover, that it considered itself as released
from any obligation arising from the American
signature of the Rome Statute, given by former
President Bill Clinton on December 31, 2000.  This
withdrawal, unique in the history of international
relations, provoked harsh criticism in the international
community and from the member states of the
European Union in particular.
The fundamental gap between the European
and American position on the ICC issue has greatly
aggravated transatlantic conflict. The main difference
between the two positions involves the question of
whether ‘Universal Human Rights Jurisdiction’
constitutes an infringement on American national
sovereignty.  Within this issue, the debate centers on
prosecutorial powers, the question of immunity, the
risk of politically motivated prosecutions and the rights
of the accused in trial procedures. Each of these
topics will be explored in this analysis.
Underlying the ICC case is a transatlantic
clash of ideologies centering on two fundamentally
different interpretations of national sovereignty.
Whereas the European Union considers the ICC as
an expansion of its national sovereignty and its sphere
of influence, the U.S. views it as an infringement on
its constitutional rights (Macpherson & Kaufman,
2002, p. 220). The EU fears a possible ‘double
standard’ in international human rights law if U.S.
citizens would be granted unconditional immunity,
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case scenario. They argued that “the investigations
of the ICC prosecutor can be stopped by a vote of
two judges within the ICC’s Pre-Trial-Chamber”
(Amann, 2002, p. 4). Furthermore, the accused state
itself has “the right to challenge the jurisdiction of the
Court and its admissibility of a case” (Lee, 2002, p.
3). John Washburn points out in support for this position
that the limits for the ICC prosecutor are tight. “It
can determine only whether an act was in fact pursuant
to a particular plan or policy”(Washburn, 2002, p. 2).
Regarding the American fear of politically
motivated nominations of ICC prosecutors, the EU
took the standpoint that the US was consciously
overemphasizing that “non-democratic state parties”
(Amann, 2002, p. 4) could try to use the institutional
framework of the ICC as an arena for their hostile
actions. The EU stressed that the large majority of
the member states of the Assembly of States are stable
democracies which have excellent relations with the
US. Historical precedence and the record of
international institutions like the UN give no evidence
of scenarios like the ‘unaccountable prosecutor’.
As to the US fear that the ICC is a challenge
to the primacy of the Security Council, the EU
emphasized the central role of the UN SC under the
present ICC Statute (Macpherson & Kaufman, 2002).
Article 13(b) rules that referrals made by the Security
Council must be accepted by the ICC prosecutor, if
all permanent members and a majority of the
nonpermanent members of the SC agree upon them.
Lee emphasizes that the right of referral can even be
used as an instrument for the Security Council in
managing future international crises:  the ICC can
replace the costly and time-consuming ad hoc tribunals
set up by the SC such as those in Yugoslavia and
Rwanda (Lee, 2002). The obvious ineffectiveness of
the ad hoc tribunals to cope with mass atrocities like
the Rwanda Genocide, Lee argues, make the call for
a permanent law enforcement mechanism even more
urgent. “Eight years after the genocide and six years
after prosecutions at both national and international
level, more than ninety-five percent of the prisoners
are still waiting for trials in overcrowded detention
centers”(Lee, 2002, p. 8). A permanent institution like
the ICC would, to a large extent, solve the problem of
ineffective Security Council tribunals. This claim can
be based upon the higher degree of effectiveness of
permanent legal bodies compared with ad hoc
institutions which have to struggle with high transaction
costs every time they are set up. Moreover, the affinity
of the permanent institution is considerably higher.
Furthermore, the “Singapore Compromise”
(Sewall, 2000, p. 63), a last minute attempt to mediate
between the US and the EU positions in this problem,
suggested that the American request for a
subordination of the ICC under the authority of the
Security Council could be transformed into the right
for the UN body to delay ICC investigations and initiate
a commission to examine the legitimacy of the ICC
measures. Article 16 of the current Statute gives the
Security Council “a form of collective control”
(Macpherson & Kaufman, 2002, p. 221), confirming
that the permanent members of the SC have the right
to “postpone an investigation for up to 12 months on a
renewable basis” (Macpherson & Kaufman, 2002, p.
221).
The Question of Immunity
The U.S. also insisted that existing
international treaty law prohibits the ICC from
exercising jurisdiction over nationals of states which
have not ratified the Rome Statute, including the U.S.
(Sewall, 2000). American head delegate David
Scheffer told the Senate, “the treaty purports to
establish an arrangement whereby U.S. armed forces
operating overseas could be conceivably prosecuted
by the international court, even if the United States
has not agreed to be bound by the treaty” (Sewall,
2000, p.214). This argument is a direct challenge of
the principle of universality as established in the Rome
Statute. US Opponents to the ICC call this universality
a ‘jurisdictional overreach’, and argue that two
problems arise from it.
First, the Rome Statute incorporates crimes
that are not recognized as crimes of universal
jurisdiction under customary international law,
particularly the as yet undefined core crime of
‘Aggression’ (Macpherson & Kaufman, 2002).
Second, according to the US, universal jurisdiction
cannot be subject to a treaty-based collective
international court.  Legitimacy for US overseas action
derives only from domestic sources like “the United
States’ constitutional structures and democratic
principles” (Patrick and Forman, 2002, p.47), never
from a treaty-based collective. The American
understanding of state sovereignty in this respect is
one of unilateral universal jurisdiction, that is, “a State
has jurisdiction to unilaterally prescribe, adjudicate and
enforce laws. This amounts to firstly establishing its
laws with regards to persons, secondly applying these
laws to these persons in criminal proceedings and
finally inducing or compelling compliance or punishing
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non-compliance with these laws” (Strapatas, 2002, p.
2). These rights cannot be delegated to international
bodies.
Proponents of the Court like Bickley mark
these American arguments as weak. He notes that
an implementation of the US conditions in the ICC
Statute would “prevent the prosecution of Saddam
Hussein for War Crimes committed by his forces in
Kuwait unless he consented” (Macpherson &
Kaufman, 2002, p. 223).  Other scholars highlight that
the American stance runs counter to the US self-
created precedent regarding several international
crime definitions, like terrorism and hijacking.
Yet one important weakness in the arguments
of the European Union regarding the question of
immunity remains: the question of the as yet undefined
crime of aggression.
Crime of Aggression - The risk of politically
motivated prosecutions
US ‘Under Secretary for Arms Control and
International Security’ John R. Bolton calls the
definition of aggression “excessively elastic”
(Bolton,2002, p. 2). The ICC could become a “political
forum”(Sewall, 2000, p. 213) to challenge political
decisions from high US officials, and non-democratic
states may initiate politicized prosecutions. As member
states of the ICC are represented in the Assembly of
States under the principle of ‘One Nation - One Vote’,
the likelihood of such scenarios is seen in Washington
as very realistic.
The American argument against a criminal
definition of aggression is often referred to as the
‘exeptionalist debate,’ meaning that the US deserves
exceptional treatment because of its unique role in
international peacekeeping operations. The US fears
that preemptive military actions such as the air strike
on the Al Shiffa pharmaceutical plant in Sudan will
be interpreted as aggression. After the US attacked
the plant in Sudan on August 20, 1998, “the president
of Sudan called for international prosecution of the
U.S. officials behind the air strike” (Sewall, 2000, p.
213). He labeled the air strike a crime of aggression
and war crime. Because of fears that US service
members could be prosecuted for similar operations,
the US wanted the “right of veto to prevent any of its
own nationals being brought to trial” (Macpherson &
Kaufman, 2002, p. 221).
However, the EU refused to grant the US
veto power, stating that the crimes under ICC
jurisdiction were crimes against humanity, which
deserve treatment as absolute universal crimes. The
EU pointed out that exemptions were counter-
productive to the goals of the ICC and would set a
dangerous example undermining the authority of the
Court.
There are several views concerning the
current debate over the crime of aggression.  Some
argue that this Crime will never be defined, because
of its sensitivity and the lack of consensus for a
common definition under the ICC Statute. And there
are those, like Dr. Claus Kress (Kress, 2002), who
maintain that, based on customary international law,
aggression will be regarded as the type of war initiated
by Hitler. There is no evidence, according to Kress,
that military actions of type ‘Kosovo 1999’ or
‘Afghanistan 2001’ could ever be included into the
crime definition of aggression, especially considering
the national interests of the large majority of the
Assembly of States. As a definition of the Crime of
Aggression has to be adopted with a two-thirds
majority within this body, Kress sees the US concerns
to a certain extent devitalized (Kress, 2002).
Regarding politically motivated prosecutions
initiated not by a hostile state party but by a biased
prosecutor, Amann adds that under the principle of
complementarity, the ICC judges cannot approach a
case as long as a national jurisdiction is “willing” to
precede it. Some ICC supporters, such as Amnesty
International, claim that the United States would ensure
its national interests if it would enact national human
rights legislation identical or similar to the ICC
jurisdiction into the American Constitution, because
the more “US laws conform to those of the ICC, the
more the US legal system can deal with cases that
might interest the ICC, and thus shield US nationals
from international prosecution” (Amann, 2002, p. 10).]
The rights of the accused in trial procedures
Some American law experts see in the ICC
Statute the risk of unfair trial proceedings, because it
lacks fundamental U.S. constitutional safeguards such
as the right to trial by jury and protection against double
jeopardy. Also missing are alternatives to prosecution.
The US argues that the failure of the ICC to
“acknowledge the legitimacy of local amnesties,”
which are a tool of truth commissions, cannot be
accepted (Macpherson & Kaufman, 2002, p 222-24).
But this standpoint is not universal in America.  One
representative of the American Bar Association
announced in a congressional hearing that the “Treaty
of Rome contains the most comprehensive list of due
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process protections which has so far been
promulgated” (Amann, 2002, p.5).
There is also no reason why the lack of a
right to trial by jury necessarily precludes US
participation in an ICC court. Numerous examples in
US legal practice show that there is already variance
permitted in the rules of procedure. American military
courts are not restricted to the guidelines of the civilian
procedures, and furthermore, the US has historically
cooperated with international military tribunals, even
when procedural differences existed. “US courts also
have rejected US nationals’ claims that the Constitution
forbids their surrender to foreign courts that follow
procedures unlike those in the United States“(Amann,
2002, p. 10). These examples suggest that “as long as
the ICC’s practices meet minimum standards of
fairness, they should not prevent US participation in
the international court” (Amann, 2002, p.11).
Additionally, Article 53 of the Rome Statute vests the
ICC prosecutor with the power to decline a case,
where “a prosecution is not in the interests of justice,
taking into account all circumstances” (Macpherson
& Kaufman, 2002, p 224), which may be interpreted
as allowing the ICC to grant or recognize amnesties.
Conclusion
The US position on the ICC Statute claims
that it violates certain aspects of the American
constitution, mainly concerning prosecutorial powers,
immunity, the risk of politically motivated prosecutions
and the rights of the accused in trial procedures.
However, these objections are based on a basic
ideological rift between the US and the European
countries over the idea of state sovereignty.
The US definition of state sovereignty is based
only on domestic legitimization, while the EU definition
includes also the delegation of sovereign rights to
international legal bodies. The US understanding is
best described with the words of John Marshall,
former chief of Justice of the United States, who said:
“The jurisdiction of the nation, within its own territory,
is necessarily exclusive and absolute …”(Amann,
2002, p. 9). This implicates that “no International Court
has the right to override US law in the trial of US
citizen” (Macpherson & Kaufman, 2002, p. 220). The
EU definition of state sovereignty is shaped by a
‘dualism’ between supranational jurisdiction and
legislature, and intergovernmental national decision-
making. This was proven in the negotiations on the
ICC, when all member states of the European Union
adhered to a definition of state sovereignty grounded
on Absolute Universal Jurisdiction.
Necessary policy steps
The following policy recommendations which
would improve the situation pragmatically are taking
for granted that both sides, even in times of
extraordinary transatlantic tensions have a natural
interest to continue to cooperate.  This assumption
stays valid even in case of ideological and conceptual
disagreement like we have seen in the ICC dispute.
However, all pragmatic steps will have to focus first
on improving the transatlantic relationship in general,
especially since the open confrontation about the Iraq
war in 2003 has destroyed several channels of mutual
understanding. Reinvention of effective transatlantic
communication on the basis of “lowest-common-
denominator policy” (Moravcsik, 2003, p.81) is
therefore crucial. Moravcsik suggests striking a new
“Transatlantic Bargain”.  As in most of its history, the
Western Alliance should again clearly distinguish
between core cooperation and other, controversial
issues. Informal issue-related work summits could help
in this respect moving beyond superficial accusations
on both sides. An early warning system for crisis
management centering in something like a
‘Transatlantic Council’ could produce decent
diplomatic agreement or at least understanding before
both sides battle their problems in the media.
After a revitalization of the transatlantic
communication channels, both the US and the EU must
take several steps to promote an atmosphere of mutual
trust. This will demand concessions on both sides. First,
the US should amend its US Federal Criminal Code
(Title 18) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice
(Title 10) to ensure that they incorporate all ICC-
defined crimes. This would demonstrate the
commitment of the US to the fight for international
human rights and, secondly, ensure that all possible
ICC crimes could be investigated domestically under
the principle of complementarity. Additionally, the US
should limit its claims for immunity to the as yet
undefined crime of aggression, and cease its efforts
to pressure governments into Article 98(2)
International Agreements, which is a bilateral
agreement between the US and any foreign
government that US citizens will not be surrendered
to ICC jurisdiction under any circumstances.  This
agreement is unreasonable when ICC jurisdiction
covers the worst crimes against humanity, and
undermines the position of the US in its insistence on
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immunity in the case of aggression.   Only Americans
under the guidance of the US government, such as
soldiers and diplomats, should gain immunity.  Finally,
states making bilateral agreements with the US should
be excluded from the right to protect their national
citizens before the ICC, meaning that EU member
states must restrict themselves from demanding
exemptions. The EU on the other hand should engage
in dialogue with Washington about the crime of
aggression. A work-summit could intoduce a new
formula for a crime definition, which would not hinder
the US to engage into preemtive invasions if they are
clearly marked by their humanitarian intension and
backed by the international community. If no
compromise can be reached, EU officals should
promote an exclusion of this crime definition from the
Rome Statute. In this way, Washington could rethink
its position to join. Moreover, the EU should encourage
the newly elected 1st ICC prosecutor, Argentine lawyer
Luis Moreno Ocampo, to engage in intense dialogue
with Washington, in the hope to destroy the idea of
the ‘unaccountable prosecutor’.  In particular, the
courts’ principles of complementarity with national
legislation can play a crucial role to convince
Wahsington that as long as American legal institutions
are engaged in investigations, the ICC will not take
over jurisdiction.
The ICC is as much an example of an
ideological rift as it is a conceptual rift between the
European Union and the United States of America.
The ‘new realism’ in US foreign policy since
September 11th  will constantly overlap with and
confront the EU’s attempt to transfer its own
framework of binding multilateral agreements onto the
level of the international community. Therefore we
have some evidence that the key problems we have
seen in the case of the ICC (such as the definition of
state sovereignty) will also hinder or even block
necessary coordinated policy steps in the future. A
new Transatlantic bargain, as suggested by Moravcsik,
should therefore focus rather on viable and
institutionalized conflict management than on
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